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In order to work, international peace- and statebuilding has had to reshape the traditional notion of 
state sovereignty and legitimize increasingly interventionist endeavours in terms of an attenuated 
‘shared’ sovereignty. Over the last decade, however, governments in recipient states have pushed 
back, demanding a more active role in negotiating with their OECD counterparts. The g7+ group, an 
international organization of now 20 self-proclaimed fragile states, has evolved as a key actor from 
the global South dealing with international peace- and statebuilding. The group's approach to 
multilateral negotiations on development goals, and its creative use of donor concepts and 
approaches such as resilience, ownerships and measuring development progress, challenge the 
customary peace- and statebuilding practices. This challenge demonstrates that political elites in 
fragile states have started to self-confidentially occupy the arenas of statebuilding and development. 
This article argues that in so-doing the g7+ group establishes a post-liberal sovereignty claim that is 
based on two pillars: resilient nationhood, and selectivity in the application of global liberal 
principles. Since it relies on the development policy principle of national ownership, such post-liberal 




This article argues that the move induced by international statebuilding away from ‘sovereign but 
equal states’ towards forms of shared sovereignty with ‘fragile states’ is currently under a converse 
renegotiation. Fragile states are fighting back; and in doing so, rather than reasserting sovereign 
equality, they are using the very language and tools of western states by fashioning a new form of 
post-liberal discourse as a mode of co-optive resistance. 
The g7+ group of self-proclaimed fragile states provides a striking example of this dynamic. Since its 
foundation in the late 2000s, the group has significantly influenced the international debate on 
peace- and statebuilding. Its membership currently comprises 20 states ‘that are or have been 
affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development’.1 The organization 
has evolved as the main counterpart of the OECD donor states in development forums such as the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). It currently plays a considerable 
role in the international bargaining on peace- and statebuilding goals, and is able to influence 
development debates in general, for example around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The voice currently raised by fragile states does not address the development realm alone.2 It 
pierces to the very heart of international relations, particularly concerning interpretations of and 
approaches to state sovereignty. Its new prominence points towards a structural transformation in 
the global realm towards a fluid, multipolar setting: the increasing flexibility in picking and choosing 
international partners constitutes an emerging ‘global marketplace of political change’.3 The 
existence of such a marketplace undermines the foundations of global liberal governance, which 
rested on the supremacy of the OECD member states over the rest of the world. However, 
                                                          
1 g7+, ‘Who we are’, 2016, http://www.g7plus.org/en/who-we-are. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs 
cited in this article were accessible on 8 Sept. 2017.) See also g7+, g7+ Charter: “Pathways towards Resilience” (Dili: g7+ 
Secretariat, 2016). 
2 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, voice, and the state’, World Politics 31: 1, Oct. 1978, pp. 90–107. 
3 Thomas Carothers and Oren Samet-Marram, The new global marketplace of political change (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2015). 
sovereignty’s ‘unsharing’ is not just a consequence of a transformed international environment; it 
also relies on a distinctive post-liberal discourse. 
This article’s argument proceeds as follows. First, the conceptual idea of ‘unsharing’ sovereignty is 
positioned within the scholarly debate on state sovereignty and its contingent, relational nature. The 
second part engages with the shift in structural conditions that enables the process of ‘unsharing’, 
using the emergence and rise of the g7+ group as a key illustration. The suggestion is made that a 
new global marketplace of political change offers the potential for truly multipolar partnerships that 
undermine the former predominance of the OECD world. Furthermore, the current generation of 
international statebuilding,4 with its reference to context, resilience and hybridity, offers an 
auspicious entry point for Southern governments to contest the principles of global liberal 
governance. The trend among development actors to circumvent the governmental level in order to 
work with a trans-scalar ‘local’ is a challenge to which elites in states subject to peace- and 
statebuilding intervention need to respond. The formation of the g7+ group may be seen as an 
answer to this challenge. 
In the third part of the article, the main elements of the g7+’s sovereignty discourse are unpacked. 
The enquiry is assisted by a systematic qualitative analysis of key policy documents from the 
organization itself, key political figures from its member states, and the IDPS.5 Drawing on this 
analysis, the article argues that the g7+ successfully uses the development principle of ‘ownership’ in 
order to turn the statebuilding relationship upside down. In so doing, it creates a new post-liberal 
notion of state sovereignty. The fourth and final part of the article discusses the substance of this 
sovereignty claim. It flexibly refers to international liberal norms, so it is not anti-liberal. Yet it 
deliberately adopts the reference to social context in current development discourse to make 
compliance with, and application of, liberal norms subject to the core political business of the 
‘resilience of the nation’. It is this reworking of the concept of ownership that gives the g7+’s 
sovereignty claim a distinctive post-liberal character. 
 
‘Sharing’ sovereignty 
Sovereignty in international law relies on the legal principle of non-interference.6 Traditional 
accounts in International Relations (IR) and diplomacy, in contrast, have commonly understood 
sovereignty not as a legal doctrine, but as a political, relational concept, albeit also relying on non-
interference as its cornerstone.7 In this ‘Westphalian sovereignty’,8 the ‘exclusive control within a 
given territory’ was conceived of as the foundation of states that were ‘autonomous and 
independent from each other’,9 and thus formed the constitutive institution of IR and international 
                                                          
4 This generational approach follows Oliver P. Richmond, ‘A genealogy of peacemaking: the creation and re-creation of 
order’, Alternatives 26: 3, July 2001, pp. 317–48, and A post-liberal peace (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 15. 
For a similar argument in the realm of statebuilding, see Jan Pospisil and Florian P. Kühn, ‘The resilient state: new 
regulatory modes in international approaches to state building?’, Third World Quarterly 37: 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 1–16.  
5 The empirical analysis was conducted as a software-assisted qualitative content analysis of 20 policy documents, which 
are referred to in notes 76–7, 80–83, 85–93 and 95–107 below. While the selection is not all-encompassing, it contains all 
substantial statements of the organization since its inception. The documents were analysed through a two-stage process 
of structural coding, using the software NVivo. 
6 See the definition given by Steinberger: ‘State sovereignty in the sense of contemporary public international law denotes 
the basic international legal status of a state that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, 
executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to foreign law other than public international law.’ Harald 
Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’, in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia for public international law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
2003), pp. 500–521 at p. 512. 
7 J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, ‘The state and the nation: changing norms and the rules of sovereignty in International 
Relations’, International Organization 48: 1, Winter 1994, pp. 107–30 at pp. 109–10. 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 20–24. 
9 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Think again: sovereignty’, Foreign Policy, 20 Nov. 2009. 
law.10 Weak states were ‘beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms’ such as 
sovereignty,11 as even they fulfilled the elementary formal requirements,12 namely international 
recognition and UN membership. Hence, they could exercise the international rights of independent 
states, notwithstanding their lack of governmental capacity. 
During the Cold War, the two superpowers accepted the sovereignty principle at least as an 
important legal fiction,13 since it benefited both blocs.14 Immediately after the end of the Cold War, 
this situation changed with the rise of humanitarian interventionism and statebuilding in the early 
1990s.15 At a global level, structural changes, especially the appearance of a multitude of non-state 
actors, challenged the state’s role as the predominant source of authority.16 Moreover, efforts 
towards international conflict resolution and statebuilding increased significantly, both because of a 
perceived rise in internal violent conflict,17 and because the post-Cold War environment facilitated 
expansive forms of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and even international administration. These 
endeavours depend on the exact opposite of Westphalian sovereignty: the endorsement of outside 
interference. Ironically, the UN system rests on both pillars—state sovereignty, and international 
intervention in the name of peace. How to negotiate this contradiction, as Kalevi Holsti called it even 
before the heyday of humanitarian interventionism,18 is ‘the ultimate question’ facing the 
international system. 
Responses to this question, driven by the protagonists of interventionist politics, were actively 
propounded in the late 1990s. Sovereignty came to be reconfigured as state responsibility was 
increasingly paired with state capacity.19 As early as 2001, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty highlighted the responsibility issue in its famous report on the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’. Referring to the UN Charter, the report called for ‘a necessary re-
characterization . . . from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal 
functions and external duties’.20 Hence, sovereignty was no longer a protection against outside 
interference, but a ‘shared responsibility’ that had to be constantly proven by behaviour compliant 
with the expectations of the dominant global powers.21 If it were not, the ‘international community’ 
                                                          
10 Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012; first publ. 1977), p. 8. 
11 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p. 24. 
12 See Kalevi J. Holsti, The state, war, and the state of war (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 61–81. 
13 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Matthias Herdegen and Gregory H. Fox, ‘Comments on chapters 4 and 5’, in Michael Byers and 
Georg Nolte, eds, United States hegemony and the foundation of international law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp. 176–94 at pp. 178–9. 
14 See e.g. Barkin and Cronin, ‘The state and the nation’, p. 125. 
15 Barkin and Cronin, ‘The state and the nation’, pp. 125–8. 
16 See e.g. Neil Walker, ed., Sovereignty in transition (Haywards Heath: Hart, 2006). 
17 See e.g. Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: organized violence in a global era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
18 Holsti, The state, war, and the state of war, p. 202. 
19 There are also historical precursors that refer to sovereign responsibilities: see Luke Glanville, ‘The antecedents of 
“sovereignty as responsibility”’, European Journal of International Relations 17: 2, June 2010, pp. 233–55. 
20 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 13. See also Francis Mading Deng et al., Sovereignty as 
responsibility: conflict management in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996); Philip Cunliffe, ‘Sovereignty and 
the politics of responsibility’, in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch, eds, Politics without 
sovereignty: a critique of contemporary International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 39–57; Adrian Gallagher, 
‘The promise of pillar II: analysing international assistance under the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs 91: 6, 
Nov. 2015, pp. 1259–76; Kirsten Ainley, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court’, International 
Affairs 91: 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 37–53; Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, International Affairs 92: 3, May 
2016, pp. 415–34.  
21 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, Orbis 50: 1, Winter 2006, pp. 71–85 at p. 74. 
would be required to enforce responsibility, ultimately even by military means, with or without 
consent from the non-responsible state. In this way, external military intervention in internal 
matters could even become an obligation derived from sovereignty.22 
Even if, in most cases, interveners could construct legal authorization for the use of force through 
UN Security Council resolutions and mandates, Westphalian sovereignty interpreted in a strict sense 
became a fragile and contested construct and lost its purchase as a global norm.23 While such 
challenges have been posed before, for instance during the debt crisis of the 1980s,24 this time the 
asserted obligation to intervene transformed sovereignty’s normative content itself. Stephen 
Krasner’s famous notion of sovereignty as an ‘organized hypocrisy’ needs to be understood against 
this background:25 realists in the field of IR, like himself, struggled to cope with the concept’s 
ongoing renegotiation. 
Humanitarian interventionism and international statebuilding thus led to a reworking of traditional 
understandings of sovereignty. In particular, statebuilding had begun to link validation of external 
sovereignty, requiring non-interference, with the internal side of sovereignty—the idea that 
sovereignty derives from a relationship with one’s citizens that legitimates central state authority.26 
In the process, a conditional sovereignty was established that involved a ‘dual responsibility of the 
state towards other members of international society on the one hand, and its own citizens on the 
other’.27 Sovereignty itself became ‘shared’.28 
The radically expanded idea of sovereign responsibility opened up contradictions with post-colonial 
sovereignty claims by the states subject to intervention. They, in turn, linked the principle of non-
interference to arguments based on specific historical experiences and conditions, as well as to the 
quest for alternative forms of social organization and political orientation.29 
More often than not, when confronted by such claims, international actors saw sovereignty as ‘the 
problem rather than the solution’.30 Despite upholding principles of ownership and development 
partnership, the international donor community has never been interested in aid recipients 
themselves playing too active a role.31 Nonetheless, it remains vital that developing states formally 
retain control. This is important for both sides: it enables international partners to display their 
                                                          
22 See S. Neil MacFarlane, Carolin J. Thielking and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: is anyone interested in 
humanitarian intervention?’, Third World Quarterly 25: 5, 2004, pp. 977–92 at p. 981. 
23 See Barkin and Cronin, ‘The state and the nation’, p. 128; Alex Bellamy, ‘A chronic protection problem: the DPRK and the 
responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 91: 4, July 2015, pp. 225–44; Derek Averre and Lance Davies, ‘Russia, 
humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria’, International Affairs 91: 4, July 2015, pp. 
813–34. 
24 Jackson, Quasi-states, pp. 124–31; David Scott, ‘The aftermaths of sovereignty: postcolonial criticism and the claims of 
political modernity’, Social Text, no. 48, Fall 1996, pp. 1–26 at p. 12. 
25 Krasner, Sovereignty. 
26 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Review. Continuity and transformation in the world polity: toward a neorealist synthesis’, World 
Politics 35: 2, Jan. 1983, pp. 261–85 at p. 276. 
27 Dominik Zaum, The sovereignty paradox: the norms and politics of international statebuilding (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 4. 
28 The notion of ‘shared sovereignty’ developed in the policy debate on the status of Kosovo; see International Commission 
on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s future (Sofia: Centre for Liberal Strategies, 2005), p. 18; cf. James R. Hooper and 
Paul R. Williams, ‘Earned sovereignty: the political dimension’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 31: 3, 2002–
03, pp. 355-72; David Chandler, Empire in denial: the politics of state-building (London: Pluto, 2006). 
29 Scott, ‘The aftermaths of sovereignty’, p. 11. 
30 David Chandler, International statebuilding: the rise of post-liberal governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 45; cf. 
also p. 64: ‘The paradigm of international statebuilding presupposes a different and non-rights-based framing of 
international regulations of the post-colonial state.’ 
31 Louise Andersen, ‘What to do? The dilemmas of international engagement in fragile states’, in Louise Andersen, Bjørn 
Møller and Finn Stepputat, eds, Fragile states and insecure people? Violence, security, and statehood in the twenty-first 
century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 21–43 at pp. 31–4. 
proclaimed altruism, and maintain the sovereignty-based international system, since the principle as 
such applies to them as well and thus needs to be upheld; for developing states, this pretence is 
equally essential, since their ruling elites’ internal legitimacy depends on the international 
recognition of their role and of the states they are running.32 
Developments in the post-Cold War era have thus rendered sovereignty not a fixed attribute of 
statehood,33 but an attribute that is contingent and dependent upon perceptions and practices.34 
David Chandler depicts this transformation as the distinction between autonomy and sovereignty in 
statebuilding: to bring the latter in line with the goal of liberal expansion, the former had to be 
overcome. Sovereignty was accordingly ‘reinterpreted as the institutional mechanism through which 
the dangers of autonomy can be ameliorated’.35 Military intervention and peacekeeping missions 
could thus be legally mandated by the UN while preserving ‘the formal trappings of sovereignty’.36 
According to this logic, cases in which a state does not have at its disposal the capacities (or 
willingness) to act responsibly constitute a ‘sovereignty gap’.37 This gap needs to be filled by 
international support. For years, development actors considered this to be a technical issue of 
lacking state capacity, and addressed it by applying ‘good governance’.38 In the light of a noticeable 
absence of success, they changed their approach in the late 2000s towards a stronger focus on 
community-based interventions. From now on, policy design should be informed primarily by the 
local context, not by blueprints derived from international development frameworks. Concepts such 
as ‘resilience’ or ‘inclusive political settlements’, which began to appear in development discourse at 
that time, signpost this shift.  
The willingness of international actors to actively engage with local and informal power settings 
while circumventing formal state institutions shows their disillusionment with attempts to establish 
a liberal order in fragile contexts.39 This so-called ‘local turn’ supplemented shared sovereignty from 
above with a form of sometimes contradictory, non-territorial shared sovereignty from below.40 This 
time sovereignty was shared by establishing a direct relationship between international actors and 
citizens or communities, in the guise of a relationship of trust that was absent between local 
populations and the state. 
 
The emergence of the g7+ 
The emergence of the g7+ as the first organized assembly of self-proclaimed fragile states has to be 
understood against the background of the shared sovereignty trend. The group was born in the 
course of the consultations during the High-level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, sponsored by the 
OECD, which established the IDPS. Initiated by the governments of Timor-Leste and the Democratic 
                                                          
32 See Nathaniel Berman, ‘Intervention in a “divided world”: axes of legitimacy’, in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc 
Coicaud, eds, Fault lines of international legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 115–46 at pp. 144–
5. 
33 Janice E. Thomson, ‘State sovereignty in International Relations: bridging the gap between theory and empirical 
research’, International Studies Quarterly 39: 2, June 1995, pp. 213–33 at p. 219. 
34 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ‘The social construction of state sovereignty’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and 
Cynthia Weber, eds, State sovereignty as social construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1–22 at p. 12. 
35 Chandler, International statebuilding, pp. 46–7. 
36 Chandler, International statebuilding, p. 55. 
37 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing failed states: a framework for rebuilding a fractured world (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 83. 
38 Chandler, International statebuilding, p. 48. 
39 Cf. Christine Bell, What we talk about when we talk about political settlements: towards inclusive and open political 
settlements in an era of disillusionment, PSRP working paper no. 1 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2015). 
40 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The local turn in peace building: a critical agenda for peace’, Third World 
Quarterly 34: 5, June 2013, pp. 763–83. 
Republic of the Congo, the first meeting gathered representatives from, besides those two countries, 
Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Sierra Leone,.41  
The new organization clearly defined its goal from the outset: to (re-)establish the voice of 
government elites against the threat of an increasing focus on the local in international 
interventions. ‘The g7+ symbolizes the ﬁrst time in history that we, as fragile states, have a voice in 
shaping global policy, advocating our own country-led and country-owned transitions out of 
fragility.’42 The question of national ownership of development cooperation—in contrast to the 
ownership of the development process by beneficiaries themselves—was brought back to the table. 
The ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ was the first major outcome of this process.43 
Given the strong sentiments of self-critique that accompanied the local turn in the peace- and 
statebuilding community, it is unsurprising that the initiative was widely welcomed in policy and 
academic circles. Benevolent analysts and practitioners alike asserted that the group would present 
‘an important new voice’ that ‘carries high expectations’.44 Oliver Richmond, for example, 
interpreted the g7+ as an innovation of hybrid peacebuilding, as it ‘brought to the fore the notion 
that societies and their elites also build peace and states, not just donors or state elites’.45 
The importance of the g7+, and the recognition it has gained, have grown rapidly: internationally, 
where the group has played a substantial part in the negotiations on the SDGs,46 but also among the 
target group of fragile states. Its membership figure—despite recurring managerial problems—has 
risen from the initial seven to 20 states.47 The g7+ is now an established and formalized international 
organization with an alternating chair, a standing secretariat and regular ministerial meetings.48 A 
recent review study confirms its influence on international policy-making even beyond the IDPS.49  
The evolution of the g7+ was also enabled by, and has in turn contributed to, a significant change in 
international conditions towards what Thomas Carothers and Oren Samet-Marram have called the 
‘global marketplace of political change’.50 The western model of governance ‘now faces serious 
competition from alternative, non-western models in the eyes of power holders and publics in 
different parts of the world’.51 The emergence of this global marketplace is being fostered by a 
                                                          
41 Vanessa Wyeth, ‘Knights in fragile armor: the rise of the “g7+”’, Global Governance 18: 1, Jan. 2012, pp. 7–12 at p. 8; g7+, 
Strength in fragility: “we are writing our own history”—the emergence of the g7+ group from our own perspective (Dili: g7+ 
Secretariat, 2016), p. 10. 
42 Emilia Pires, Building peaceful states against all odds: the g7+ leads the way, USAID Frontiers in Development report 
(Washington DC: the US Agency for International Development [USAID], 2012), p. 5. 
43 IDPS, ‘A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’, signed at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 
South Korea, 30 Nov. 2011); henceforth the ‘New Deal’. For the history of the New Deal, see Tobias Nussbaum, Eugenia 
Zorbas and Michael Koros, ‘A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: analysis’, Conflict, Security and Development 12: 
5, Nov. 2012, pp. 559–87. 
44 Wyeth, ‘Knights in fragile armor’, p. 7. 
45 Oliver P. Richmond, Failed statebuilding: intervention and the dynamics of peace formation (New Haven, CT, and London: 
Yale University Press, 2014), p. 163. 
46 This is confirmed by a recent independent review of the New Deal, which highlights the largely successful efforts of the 
g7+ in building negotiation coalitions: see Sarah Hearn, Independent review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States (New York: New York University, 2016), p. 24. See further Kaifala Marah, ‘The g7+ global perspectives on the 
Sustainable Development Goals’, public address by the chair of the g7+, Dili, Timor-Leste, 21 Sept. 2015, p. 14. 
47 Besides the initial seven members, these are Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Papua New 
Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Togo and Yemen. Records on which countries are 
founding members vary, as the g7+ website—in contrast to Wyeth, ‘Knights in fragile armor’—lists Liberia and South Sudan 
in this category, but not the Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire. 
48 g7+, g7+ Charter. 
49 Hearn, Independent review of the New Deal, p. 23. 
50 Carothers and Samet-Marram, The new global marketplace of political change. 
51 Carothers and Samet-Marram, The new global marketplace of political change, p. 30. 
deliberate strategy of multipolarity applied by actors such as China.52 Other so-called ‘new donors’,53 
along with wealthy partners such as the Gulf states, provide substantial and effective funding 
alternatives that openly compete with those provided by the OECD donors. The multiplicity of actors 
that are nowadays actively involved in fragile states offers government elites the opportunity to 
choose alliances flexibly and on the basis of particular issues. Such a fluid form of multipolarity 
sweeps away the carrots and sticks of liberal interventionism, and opens up considerable political 
space beyond traditional donor–recipient relationships. This global marketplace of competing actors 
thus provides the necessary material conditions for the g7+’s sovereignty claim. 
Notwithstanding the changing structural conditions, OECD donors, at least rhetorically, display a high 
level of trust and commitment towards the g7+. Whereas the group is not able to substantially alter 
the concrete modes of aid delivery, it is able to generate influence on the general level of the 
international discourse.54 This is attributable to two factors. The first is its highly effective public 
relations work, particularly by the government of Timor-Leste which also contributes the bulk of 
funding.55 Its history and its international role render this country well placed to take on a leading 
role within the organization. Timor-Leste has also the personal capacity to do so: its Finance 
Minister, Emilia Pires, who acted as the first chair of the g7+ and quickly became the organization’s 
international face, was—and still is—a key driver of the process.56 
Second, the g7+ is hitting the right tone at the right time at international development gatherings. 
Thus the OECD partners in the IDPS explicitly link the presence of ‘countries affected by conflict and 
fragility’ with the opportunity ‘to identify, agree and realize more effective ways of supporting 
transitions out of fragility and building peaceful states’.57 Statements by g7+ advisers and like-
minded observers are even more pointed. Simon Fenby, senior adviser to the former Prime Minister 
of Timor-Leste Xanana Gusmão, frames the responsibility of g7+ governments as a normative claim: 
‘It can . . . be readily appreciated that the leaders of fragile states might be preoccupied with 
questions of state building and peace building as this is arguably their primary responsibility as 
national leaders.’58  
Further support comes from academic voices, especially those arguing from a post-colonial position. 
Lindsay Whitfield and Alastair Fraser, for example, ‘advance a normative case for the right of African 
governments to define their own policies which is grounded in the notion of “popular sovereignty”, a 
concept imbued with the values of self-determination, democracy, and non-racialism’.59 Such 
accounts presume a remarkably high level of public participation and representation in fragile states. 
The assumption that governments will act in the spirit of ‘national leadership’ and in the sense of 
                                                          
52 Denis M. Tull, ‘China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
44: 3, Sept. 2006, pp. 459–79. 
53 See e.g. Ngaire Woods, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development 
assistance’, International Affairs 84: 6, Nov. 2008, pp. 1205–21; Lei Yu, ‘China’s strategic partnership with Latin America: a 
fulcrum in China’s rise’, International Affairs 91: 5, Sept. 2015, pp. 1047–68. 
54 This is confirmed by interviews in the donor realm: UK Department for International Development (DFID), Aug. 2017; 
Austrian Development Cooperation, July 2017. 
55 g7+, Annual Report 2014–2015 (Dili: g7+ Secretariat, 2015), p. 20. 
56 For example, Pires, Building peaceful states against all odds, is an appraisal of the g7+ published by USAID. 
57 OECD, ‘International Dialogue and Partnership’, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-
peace/conflictandfragility/internationaldialogueandpartnership.htm. 
58 Simon Fenby, ‘The g7+ group of fragile states: towards better international engagement and accountability in aid 
delivery to fragile nations’, in Damien Kingsbury, ed., Critical reflections on development (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 33–49 at p. 41; see also Wyeth, ‘Knights in fragile armor’. 
59 Lindsay Whitfield and Alastair Fraser, ‘Introduction: aid and sovereignty’, in Lindsay Whitfield, ed., The politics of aid: 
African strategies for dealing with donors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 1–26 at p. 6. 
‘popular sovereignty’ ignores the usually problematic shape of the underlying political settlement 
which renders these states fragile in the first place. 
The key element introduced to safeguard against a government dominance in the New Deal was 
meant to be the substantial inclusion of civil society, especially in country assessments and in 
negotiating what the New Deal calls ‘one national vision and one plan’.60 The framework outlined 
guarantees the participation of national civil society organizations in the assessment exercise and 
the subsequent negotiation of a country compact.61 Yet implementation reveals a mixed picture, 
with particular problems in some countries.62 South Sudan represents a well-documented case that 
highlights the substantial problems associated with such inclusivity. The in-country process was 
rushed and dominated by international consultants embedded in government ministries.63 Most 
players outside the dominant faction of the elite settlement were not present at the consultations, 
which therefore led to absurdly optimistic results.  
Just a few months after the fragility assessment estimated that the country would have already 
entered a ‘rebuild and reform’ stage, elite power politics took over and a civil war broke out. This left 
civil society actors disillusioned: ‘The politics of the day however did not allow room for compromise 
on peace building and state building issues with any other stakeholders except those internal actors 
that wielded military power and have the potential of destabilizing the territorial authority and 
control of the government.’64 
International monitoring also suggested that the inclusion instituted under the New Deal remained 
superficial. Even the official IDPS monitoring report admitted that while, in general, the involvement 
of ‘national stakeholders, including civil society’ in fragility assessments had taken place, ‘the length 
and extent of the consultations varied’.65 The independent review of the IDPS confirms these 
findings.66 
 
Resilience, solidarity, self-measurement: the discourse of the g7+ 
Irrespective of these practical issues, the g7+ has changed the way state sovereignty is understood 
and negotiated in countries subject to international statebuilding. Since its emergence, the 
organization and its members have established a unique discourse that disrupts the narrow realm of 
donor–recipient relationships. Its message is predominantly directed to the ‘international 
community’,67 which reads as very vague, but offers opportunities to flexibly connect and apply its 
claims to audiences beyond the obvious target group of the OECD countries. Recent g7+ documents 
do not even mention the IDPS, an omission that supports some donors’ perceptions that the g7+ 
wants to be seen as an independent international organization that reaches beyond the donor 
realm.68  
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In this undertaking, the language of the g7+’s discourse is more important than the organization’s 
actual influence in directing donor intervention. As has always been the case with sovereignty 
claims, it would be difficult to trace any direct measurable impact on state behaviour. But discourse 
as a theatre of contestation is the main arena for structural claims that then alter the political space 
for external intervention. The discourse makes effective use of donor wording, and relies on the 
donor’s self-critical awareness of a lack of ‘ownership’.69 Presenting the New Deal’s agenda in terms 
of a quest for country ownership not only resonates with the non-interference approach of new 
donors such as China;70 it puts severe constraints on any political involvement by international 
partners. Thus it enables the g7+ members to prolong international assistance while keeping at bay 
interventions aimed at circumventing the national political level.  
Three elements are constitutive in this respect. First, the discourse creates a specific notion of 
‘resilience’ that takes the nation rather than the individual or local community as its central 
reference point. Second, the discourse calls for an unconditional solidarity that resonates with, but 
also transforms, the older paradigm of post-colonialism. Third, the discourse raises the ownership 
question with reference to donor demands to measure progress, in a way that essentially promotes 
‘self-measurement’. The emphasis on these three elements is a deliberate response to the current 
crisis in statebuilding. It is significant, yet ironic, that recipient countries use the concepts that 
indicate this crisis—in particular resilience, conditionality and local ownership71—for their own 
strategic interests. By adjusting both the concepts and their content, the g7+ has turned them into 
cornerstones of its quest to transform and renew state sovereignty in a fashion that takes it away 
from the shared sovereignty that sought to limit the power of its members. In the following sections, 
the three pillars of the g7+’s sovereignty discourse are unpacked. 
 
Resilience 
For the OECD, resilient states are characterized in two different ways: on the one hand, they ‘are 
capable of absorbing shocks and transforming and channelling radical change’; on the other hand, 
they have certain structural characteristics, first and foremost the ‘capacity and legitimacy of 
governing a population and its territory’.72 As David Chandler points out, these two elements, when 
emphasized by donors, enable ‘the rationalisation and legitimisation of a broad range of external 
policy interventions in the societal sphere’, which in turn implies a radical expansion of 
‘interventionist practices’ to the social realm.73 Resilience substitutes for the liberal ideas of building 
a state and its institutions ‘local capacities, practices, and understandings’ as ‘the means and the 
ends of intervention’.74 Current applications of resilience in statebuilding hence complement 
ongoing top-down efforts in institution-building with bottom-up approaches focusing on particularly 
vulnerable communities. 
Both aspects—the focus on the social realm and the avoidance of top-down processes in 
statebuilding—create existential challenges for elitist political settlements. Their main stronghold at 
the international level, the formal, institutionalized state and its central organizations, is at risk of 
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becoming neglected. The g7+ adopts resilience as its main vision, through the motto ‘pathways 
toward resilience’.75 Yet, while still accepting the theoretical part of the OECD’s definition, the g7+ 
counters it with a notion of resilience that ties it to a teleological idea of nationhood: ‘Resilience 
refers to the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the internal and external shocks and 
setbacks they are likely to face. Fragility thus implies that the consolidation of nationhood, and the 
safety, security and well-being of the citizens are at risk of a relapse into crisis or violent conflict. This 
risk is gradually reduced as the institutions develop the necessary ability to cope with the type of 
threats they are exposed to.’76 
This definition intrinsically links resilience to the evolution of a nation. At first glance, this seems to 
resemble the ‘resilient nations’ slogan that multilateral development actors such as the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) have been using since the early 2010s.77 However, the concept is 
turned upside down: nationhood in the meaning put forward by the g7+ is presented as a given; 
resilience, in turn, becomes a key aspect of its consolidation. Consistently with this interpretation, 
those who are to benefit from safety, security and well-being are ‘citizens’ or the state’s people, and 
not communities or populations.78 The reference to citizenship, despite the term’s being a 
constitutive element of political liberalism, is not meant to embrace a liberal polity; on the contrary, 
it is intended to emphasize the unchallengeable role of the state.79 
Such a reframing has two implications. First, on the ideological level, resilience in this meaning 
underlines that the concern of the g7+ governments is with ‘the development of the nations of its 
members’,80 and with ‘the national sovereignty of its members’.81 The focus of this concern is not 
the resilience of the nation as a social dimension of a democratic state, but the resilience of the 
sovereign nation-state at the level of international relations, and as a key tool for elite dominance of 
the social playing field. In a paradoxical move, resilience is turned into a sovereign vision.  
Second, on the pragmatic level, resilience is tied to the development policy principle of national 
ownership. References such as the request for ‘country-led resilience strategies based on country-
owned assessment’ confirm this.82 While such a request might sound logical and in line with donor 
interests, it has one main goal: to prevent any potential circumvention of the central state by 
international interventions.83 Resilience as defined by the g7+ rejects any bottom-up perspective on 
the grounds of nationhood claims. From being one of the main conceptual tools for implementing 
the local turn in peace- and statebuilding, resilience is transformed into one of the main roadblocks 
against it. ‘Statebuilding means that donors can no longer bypass our state institutions, weakening 
our ownership and hindering our nations from building the institutions and capacity necessary for 
strong bureaucracies to serve the needs of our people.’84 
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Solidarity 
A strong appeal to solidarity between member states is the second key ingredient of g7+ documents 
and statements. Such solidarity distinguishes itself from comparable manifestations in international 
organizations by its strong wording, which recalls and reshapes the diction of Third-Worldism in the 
Bandung era of the 1960s and 1970s.85 International power relations are highlighted by the 
deliberate use of a small ‘g’ in the organization’s name.86 Membership relations are compared with 
family ties,87 reflecting a ‘deep bond’ and a common responsibility in the members’ commitment ‘to 
their nations, their people and their partners to consolidate peace, build robust, viable and 
sustainable states’.88 The g7+ has even invented a tailored application of South–South cooperation: 
‘fragile-to-fragile cooperation’.89 
As with colonialism in the Bandung era, shared experiences underpin these strong ties. ‘The reality 
of our existence as conﬂict-affected states often comes into play whenever we try to meet.’90 
Fragility shapes both the specific context and the vision of g7+ countries. Context develops into an 
important feature,91 as exposed by the collectively perceived failure of development assistance that 
was ‘often inconsistent with local priorities’,92 or the need to adjust the implementation of 
democracy to ‘local circumstances’.93 Thus solidarity comes to be closely linked with embracing non-
liberal traditions, particularly in the execution of political power, that are seen as essential for the 
establishment of ‘resilient nations’.94  
Considerable force would be necessary to shake the solidarity among g7+ members. Even in times of 
full-blown civil war with national governments acting as drivers of conflict, such as in South Sudan 
since 2013 or in the Central African Republic in 2014, the g7+ does not merely ‘empathise with the 
people’, but proclaims ‘to stand in solidarity with the government . . . in those countries’.95 
Consciously contradicting the sceptical tone in statements by international actors, such a 
proclamation of solidarity echoes the deliberate repetition by a South Sudanese official at a g7+ 
meeting of a phrase in the organization’s charter: ‘nothing about us, without us’.96 Without doubt, 
this statement refers to the government level. 
In contrast to the heyday of Third-Worldism, however, the g7+’s discourse does not explicitly refer 
to colonialism, post-colonial resistance or changing the world order. Instead, it injects notions of 
solidarity into development language and liberal internationalism, linking them with a sense of 
international power play: ‘Given the principle of solidarity, the g7+ will always advocate peace and 
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stability in its member countries . . . But success will also depend on the degree of trust and effort 
forthcoming from our partners.’97 The g7+ is committed not only to the general idea of the necessity 
of peace- and statebuilding as represented by the IDPS, but also to globally endorsed development 
goals.98 This is reflected in the group’s advocacy of the inclusion in the SDGs of Goal 16 on peace, 
justice and strong institutions,99 which also shows its commitment to actively engage in global 
governance issues. 
While the discourse of the g7+ accepts international liberal norms, it no longer does so in the 
hypercritical way characteristic of the recipient role in a development ‘partnership’ based purely on 
the transfer of resources. Instead of implicitly but effectively resisting these norms, this new and 
more self-confident uptake of them enables a blunt and open rejection of their application on the 
grounds of national interest or context. Relapses into the confrontational post-colonial discourse, 
while still playing a certain role, are no longer a core element of the stance. In this way, the g7+’s 
discourse overcomes the long series of post-colonial defeats, from the debt crises to state failure, 
and is turned into a vehicle for a leadership claim.100 
 
Self-measurement 
Measurement of peace- and statebuilding progress has developed into a main element of the g7+’s 
work. The New Deal established five ‘Peace and Statebuilding Goals’ (PSGs): legitimate politics, 
security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. The IDPS partners agreed that, 
within a year after the New Deal’s endorsement, ‘a set of indicators for each goal will have been 
developed by fragile states and international partners, which will allow us to track progress at the 
global and the country levels’.101 As their key feature, these indicators should be objectively 
measurable. 
With significant support from international experts, the g7+ engaged in developing the indicators 
and methods for this project, which was designed as an ‘inclusive exercise’.102 In 2012 it created a 
so-called ‘fragility spectrum’, which was, after a pilot assessment in South Sudan, formally launched 
in 2013.103 The spectrum’s indicators are surprisingly conservative. Country-specific indicators offer a 
flavour of context-specificity and the opportunity for an à la carte approach at the country level.104 
However, the common indicators hardly look like the promised ‘bottom-up process’ ‘developed by 
fragile states, for fragile states’.105 The agreed framework, consisting of 15 dimensions, representing 
the five PSGs, that are to be assessed along five stages signifying the way to nationhood—crisis, 
rebuilding and reform, transition, transformation and resilience—seems conventional at best. 
This suggests that in embarking on the measurement effort, the g7+ never aimed at creating 
something innovative or new, or even at offering an alternative to established measurement 
frameworks or indices. Rather, it wanted to own the interpretation of the outcome: ‘The g7+ does 
not “speak out” against the established practice of “fragility” quantification; instead, its new 
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proposals aim to establish a better hold of “numerical claims”.’106 The core purpose is the issue of 
ownership in the sense of self-measurement, while ‘shifting the accountability for established 
targets and aid interventions to donors’.107 
Self-measurement offers g7+ countries two viable options: either to apply a creative style of 
measuring in order to achieve the desired outcome, or to demand further international support if 
the assessment shows a lack of progress. The abovementioned fragility assessment for South Sudan 
is a striking example of the first approach. Barely a year before the continuous struggle within the 
South Sudanese fragile elite settlement exploded into another civil war, the country assessed itself 
as being in a ‘rebuild and reform’ stage. The inclusiveness of the political settlement showed 
particularly good results.108 The main indicator presented in this assessment was ‘diversity in 
representation in key-decision making bodies’, measured by the proxy ‘women in politics’.109 
Whereas this benchmark continues to be popular among international partners, it was hardly a 
sufficient indicator to reflect the level of factionalism within South Sudanese elites. 
How lack of progress towards the PSGs is conceptualized is even more revealing. For instance, 
fragility assessments include indicators such as ‘political and social and economic oppression’, 
‘power is based on force’, ‘majority of public community do not feel free to participate in all political 
processes’, ‘there are no checks and balances on the executive’ and ‘lack of inclusive or agreed 
political settlement’.110 Assessments of these indicators are to be organized and conducted by the 
governments of the respective states themselves, bolstered with the formal international legitimacy 
provided by the IDPS. In effect, governments are tasked with measuring their own failure. Even if 
oppressive governments were to publicly admit to failing on these indicators, the only consequence 
they would have to face in this framework is the possible discontinuation of international assistance.  
 
The g7+ and the construction of post-liberal sovereignty 
These three vital elements of the g7+’s discourse could be interpreted as a radical version of 
‘compromised peacebuilding’, an ‘implicit or tacit contract’ under which donor policies are accepted 
and implemented by partner governments in a way that does not threaten the power base of ruling 
elites and allows them to pursue their own political goals, while still allowing donors to account for 
development success. 111 The interpretation presented here, in contrast, argues that, rather than 
adding another level of mutual hypocrisy, the g7+ intends to create something qualitatively different 
and new: a post-liberal claim of sovereignty rather than a return to Westphalian sovereignty. 
The relationship between the g7+ and OECD actors is no longer based on a deliberate 
misunderstanding, as a tacit agreement would imply, but has turned into one of the ‘hybrid forms of 
politics emerging from the clash between Northern and Southern epistemologies’.112 The new 
sovereignty claim that emerges therein still accepts the principle of international responsibility and 
reminds international partners to act accordingly; at the same time, it transfers the ‘shared 
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responsibility’ of international statebuilding into a ‘mutual responsibility’ that denies any 
conditionality. Sovereignty is effectively ‘unshared’.  
The g7+ post-liberal counter-vision rests on two pillars. First, the nation-state once again becomes 
the focus of political action. By transferring resilience from the societal level of communities and 
people to the ideational level of the nation, all government action becomes justifiable, irrespective 
of any conflict with international obligations. Nevertheless, the general acceptance of liberal norms 
remains, rendering the resulting sovereignty claim not anti-liberal, but truly post-liberal. The second 
pillar of the counter-vision provides the necessary underpinning for this to work: liberal norms need 
to be contextualized and effectively owned, without being tied to the associated obligations.113 The 
need for ownership without obligations explains the importance given to measurement: 
contextualized and state-controlled measurement allows the ownership of the application of global 
liberal norms, a smart way of abiding by them without having to implement them. 
Constructivist scholars emphasize that sovereignty is, and has always been, a contingent matter of 
mutual perception and recognition, since it is a product of social norms and practices.114 The new 
rendering of sovereignty promoted by the g7+ and its member states confirms this insight. It neither 
simply rejects the responsibility-based sovereignty conceptions of liberal peace- and statebuilding by 
bluntly endorsing Westphalian sovereignty nor unconditionally embraces them. Instead, the 
sovereignty claim raised combines both of these approaches—the traditional elements of post-
colonial sovereignty as well as the liberal responsibilities of states as they are endorsed at the 
international level. The unconditional, legal element of those responsibilities, however, is made 
subject to a wide array of conditions, political, economic and contextual. The interpretation of liberal 
responsibility as entailing unconditional rights and obligations is rejected, as is the ‘shared’ 
international responsibility deriving from them. This characterizes the ‘unsharing’ of sovereignty as a 
post-liberal enterprise. 
Post-liberal sovereignty re-emphasizes the central role of the nation-state as the key actor at the 
international stage. Accordingly, the post-liberal endeavours of international actors, which abandon 
attempts to foster liberal statehood in order to focus on local agency, are dismissed. In turn, the 
fragile nation-state is reinvented as a responsible international partner, which logically requires the 
exclusive ownership of its responsibilities. The application and interpretation of all liberal norms and 
principles is transferred back to the national domain. As post-liberal sovereignty holds on to the 
general principles of liberal internationalism, it reaches beyond pure Westphalian sovereignty. Yet 
the now unshared character of state responsibility naturally opposes any attempt at delivering 
political and military support or intervention that is not explicitly invited. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis presented above has shown that the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states is 
more than either a ‘donor darling’ in current international efforts at peace- and statebuilding or a 
mere grouping of desperate states that everyone ‘wants to leave as quickly as possible’.115 The 
organization and its potential have as yet been remarkably underestimated, particularly in IR. In its 
short existence, the g7+ has substantially modified the relationship between the OECD member 
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states and states in the global South. It has transformed state- and peacebuilding, with possibly far-
reaching implications. 
Embedded in an environment characterized an increasing availability of financial resources, and 
potential support from an increasingly wide array of international actors, states and institutions, 
donor–recipient relationships will not unravel, as traditional emancipatory approaches such as post-
colonialism would suggest. Rather, their character is undergoing fundamental change. Using the 
three elements of resilience, solidarity and self-measurement, the g7+ aims to establish full 
government responsibility in all areas related to peace and statehood. Framed as an exercise of 
national ownership, post-liberal sovereignty is practised as an ‘unshared’, exclusive enterprise. It is 
qualitatively different from peace- and statebuilding as an organized hypocrisy, in which all sides 
pursued their own interests within a common framework. Post-liberal sovereignty is a deliberate 
and strategic move towards reconfiguring global power constellations. 
This strategic endeavour has implications at several levels. At the local level, the effort to turn 
international peace- and statebuilding interventions into a more political and bottom-up enterprise 
is rejected by the g7+’s discourse. Donor interventions in political processes are confronted with an 
outspoken and self-confident notion of national control: ‘We as a cabinet decided to strive for one 
thing internationally: Inclusive politics must be globalized before it is localized.’116 
At the international level, global liberal governance, which plays a fundamental role in the field of 
aid and intervention,117 is at stake. Its institutions face an increasingly manifest counter-concept, 
which already shows itself in other variations—among them, the current opposition to the 
International Criminal Court in sub-Saharan Africa, vocally supported by g7+ member countries. 
Fragile states, while commonly referred to as the weakest of the weak, show a willingness to take 
their fate back into their own hands, irrespective of absent institutional capacity, or the lack of 
political will to enact liberal statehood internally.  
Normatively, post-liberal sovereignty is difficult to counter for actors who subscribe to liberal norms, 
since it takes up the general demand of national ownership that has repeatedly been urged within 
the international development discourse. This does not imply the immediate end of liberal 
internationalism and development interventionism. While the most radical applications of global 
liberal governance are unlikely to exercise sustainable traction under these new conditions, other 
elements, such as development partnerships, will continue to be implemented. Nonetheless, the 
structural framework of these elements will become one of fully fledged multipolarity, its 
predominant quality the fluidity of partnerships. 
From being the main avenue of change, liberal internationalism or development policy interventions 
turn into one option that may—or may not—be accepted by partners. From now on, international 
engagement, however humble and local, will always be under contestation and required to take 
account of partner demands. The times of tacit agreements are all but over, as also, it seems, are the 
times of development partnerships based on donor-assessed needs. While this may be 
uncomfortable for the OECD world, the decision not to accept external assistance is in line with the 
discourse of development and liberal statebuilding. Ownership also entails the choice not to own. 
Post-liberal sovereignty is built on this choice. While this is hardly illegitimate, it waters down 
international accountability, with potentially grim consequences. 
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